Few words raise more consternation than ‘this time is different.’ Yet in the world of enterprise tech today, times are different — and they are likely to stay that way for a while.很少有哪句话比“这次不一样”更让人紧绷。在如今的企业科技领域，时代的确是有所不同了，而且这样一个时代很可能会待命一阵子。
It’s not everyday that $100-plus billion companies split themselves in two. Recall late last month, eBay’s decided to spin off its fast-growing payments division, PayPal; last week, Hewlett-Packard HP -5.89% moved to separate its PC and printer divisions off from its enterprise hardware and service groups. And most recently, Symantec’s potential split into security and data storage.不是每天都首演资产超强千亿美元的大企业的拆分大戏。但就在上个月，eBay公司要求挤压其快速增长的缴纳部门PayPal；就在上周，惠普公司（Hewlett-Packard）要求将PC和打印机部门与企业硬件和服务部门拆分。
最新消息是，赛门铁克（Symantec）很可能会拆分为两家分别专门从事安全性与数据存储业务的公司。On the other end, we just witnessed the largest acquisition in the history of cloud computing — where one of the largest software companies in the world, SAP SAP -0.77% , is buying Concur, a provider of on-demand travel and expense management software-as-a-service, for $8.3 billion.另一方面，我们刚亲眼了云计算历史上仅次于的一笔并购交易：全球仅次于的软件公司之一SAP，正在并购企业缺席管理服务商，软件即服务类公司Concur。Beyond the question of what these tech companies are worth, it’s important to ask what’s going on here? The developments can only be described as an “inversion” caused by a new shift in cloud computing. And I say inversion because the pattern we see today is almost the reverse of developments evident in the past.我们不得已不去辩论这些公司价值多少钱，目前急需搞清楚一个问题：到底再次发生了什么？这些新动向不能用云计算的新改变所引起的“直流电源”来说明。
我之所以用“直流电源”这个词，是因为今天我们所看到的模式，与过去的发展轨迹完全相反忽略。The last time technology dominated the news cycle was in 1999-2000, during which we saw something interesting happen in the years leading up to the collapse of the tech bubble — we witnessed the simultaneous rise of not just new tech companies, but established ones too. While the number of companies going public eclipsed 300, the dominant players, such as Akamai AKAM -1.77% , BEA, Cisco CSCO -1.76% , EMC EMC -1.57% , Exodus, Level 3 LVLT -2.31% , Oracle ORCL 0.34% , Sun, etc. were able to sell both the technology infrastructure picks and shovels to both new and existing companies within the Fortune 500 (many of whom were busy preparing for what turned out to be the over-hyped Y2Kopalypse).上一次科技话题支配媒体圈，还是1999年到2000年的事情。在科技泡沫裂痕前的那几年，我们看见了一些有意思的现象: 科技富二代强势兴起兴起，但老牌科技公司的展现出也非常不俗。当时扎堆上市的新科技公司多达了300家。
另一方面，一些市场主宰者，比如阿卡努（Akamai）、BEA、思科（Cisco）、EMC、Exodus、Level 3、甲骨文（Oracle）和Sun，也需要把自家的技术架构工具卖给新兴和老牌《财富》500强劲企业（其中很多公司当年都在忙着迎战被过度抹黑的“千年虫”问题）。A rising tide was indeed floating all boats back then: As big established companies provided fundamental technological infrastructure to new tech firms, the businesses of existing firms grew rapidly. Cisco, for example, grew its revenue at rates of 50% to 60%, topping $500 billion in market cap; it was widely expected to become the first $1 trillion market cap company.所谓水涨船高。随着老牌软件公司大力向新型科技公司获取基本技术架构，这些企业也在很快发展壮大。
比如，思科公司的营收以50%至60%的速度快速增长，市值一度高达5000亿美元。很多人指出它有可能沦为史上第一家市值超强万亿美元的公司。
As evident today, that didn’t happen: Cisco’s market cap stands nearly 80% below its peak level. Meanwhile, the other large established companies that benefited greatly in the 1999 to 2000 run-up are either out of business (e.g., Exodus) or have been acquired (e.g., Sun, BEA, and Peoplesoft — all by Oracle). And if they’re still standalone companies (such as Akamai, Cisco, EMC, Oracle, Microsoft, IBM, HP), then they’re showing very slow, if any, organic growth in their core computing businesses.正如你今天所闻，这一幕未再次发生。目前思科的市值只有全盛时期的20%。与此同时，其他在1999年到2000年大赚兹赚到的老牌软件公司要么注销（如Exodus），要么被并购（如Sun、BEA和Peoplesoft——这三家正好都被甲骨文并购）。
如果他们目前还是独立国家不存在的公司（如阿卡努、思科、EMC、甲骨文、微软公司、IBM和惠普等），其核心计算出来业务的内生快速增长也是十分较慢的，甚或没任何快速增长。While all this is going on, what’s particularly interesting is that the number of companies being formed and amount of dollars invested in new enterprise technologies is growing significantly. Why the disconnect? How can enterprise tech be both out of favor and wildly in favor?与此同时，尤其令人感兴趣的是，现在无论是新的正式成立公司的数量，还是新型企业科技所更有的投资额，都呈现明显的快速增长。
为什么不会产生这种“僵化”现象？企业科技为什么一方面遇冷，一方面又倍受青睐？The obvious answer is that there’s a classic technology platform shift happening, driven by the move toward cloud-based computing. But perhaps less obvious is where, and how, this platform shift is happening. And what does it tell us about what may be coming next?最显著的答案是，经典的技术平台正在再次发生变革，它于是以朝着云计算平台方向转型。但另一个答案不过于显著的问题是，这种平台变革正在什么地方，以什么方式再次发生？它否伴随着下一步将不会再次发生什么事情？The first elements of the cloud-computing shift took place at the applications level: New companies were created to deliver existing application functionality via a cloud-based, software-as-a-service (SaaS) model. Think of examples like Salesforce.com CRM -2.81% for customer relationship management, or Workday for human resources.向云计算平台的转型首先再次发生在应用于层面上。近年来，一批新的创建的公司开始通过基于云技术的“软件即服务”模式向用户交付给现有应用于功能，比如客户关系管理应用于Salesforce.com和人力资源应用于Workday。
The second elements of the cloud-computing shift are being seen at more infrastructural levels of the technology stack: databases, networking technologies, storage technologies, and so on. Think of examples like Nicira (acquired by VMware for $1.25 billion) in software-defined networking; Servicenow (a recent IPO) in systems management; or Arista Networks (another recent IPO) in networking equipment.向云计算平台转型的第二波再次发生在基础架构层面，如数据库、网络技术和存储技术等等。比如Nicira（已被VMware以12.5亿美元并购）的软件定义网络；Servicenow（最近刚上市）的系统管理技术；Arista Network（另一家最近刚上市的公司）的网络设备等等。But here’s the thing: Unlike in the 1999 to 2000 era, where established tech companies were the natural beneficiaries of venture capital investment into new companies (and turned out to be the survivors after all the dust settled), this time the established firms are potential casualties of a cloud-computing platform shift.与1999年至2000年那个时代有所不同的是，在那股风投资本转入新的公司的热潮中，老牌科技公司是自然而然的受益者，也是尘埃落定后的幸存者。然而这一次，在向云计算平台的转型中，老牌科技公司很有可能沦为受害者。
To be fair, established technology platforms haven’t entirely disappeared. As we’ve seen in past platform shifts, enterprises have big investments in existing applications that rely on this infrastructure — so obsoleting them overnight is never an option.必需否认，传统的技术平台并没几乎消失。我们在过去几次平台转型中也曾找到，企业对依赖这种技术架构的现有应用于做到了大量投资，所以要想要一夜之间让它们解散历史舞台是不有可能的。But as new applications take advantage of modern technologies, the existing technologies go largely into “maintenance” mode. That means that new revenue from licenses at legacy businesses starts growing more slowly and declines over time, while the annual maintenance and support streams from existing customers becomes the primary source of revenue. For example, IBM IBM -1.30% has reported nine straight quarters of declining top-line growth in its core business. And we are seeing early signs of this for most other established tech companies: Strong cash flows are being generated by the maintenance revenue streams, but new license revenue growth from the legacy businesses is slowing substantially.但是随着运用现代技术的新型应用于大大经常出现，现有技术在相当大程度上转入了“确保”模式。这意味著传统软件的销售收入将快速增长得更加快，最后不会渐渐衰落，而确保与反对现有客户所产生的收益将沦为其主要收益来源。
比如，IBM公司的核心业务增长率倒数9个季度下降，其它大多数老牌科技公司也显露出了这种状况的早期征兆：大量现金流来自确保收益，而传统业务的销售收入明显减慢。So who will remain standing in the aftermath of the current shift? Acquisition activity is one great indicator. That’s where news that SAP decided to acquire Concur, coupled with its previous acquisition of SuccessFactors (which was founded byAndreessen Horowitz partner Lars Dalgaard), signals that the company is leading the charge in evolving to the cloud-computing paradigm. Their acquisition strategy to date illustrates that SAP is committed to being a leading player in cloud applications in the same way as it created a massive enterprise applications franchise by riding the previous client-server platform shift.那么在这波转型彻度已完成后，谁将不会之后矗立不推倒呢？并购不道德可以被视作一个很好的指标。比如SAP要求并购Concur，再行再加此前它早已并购了SuccessFactors（该公司由安德里森o霍洛维茨基金合伙人拉尔斯o达尔加德创立），解释这家公司正在全力向云计算领域进占。
SAP的并购战略解释它致力于沦为云应用领域的领军者，正如上一次在向用户—服务器平台转型过程中，它在企业应用领域大获得顺利一样。SAP is not standing idly by. Why? Because the financial consequences of being on the wrong side of technology platform shifts can be monumental.SAP并没坐以待毙。为什么？因为在科技平台的转型中，“车站错队”的经济后果有可能十分相当严重。
Take a look at the market cap of the 10 largest enterprise incumbents (of which SAP is a member): There’s more than $1.3 trillion of market cap in this group. But if you look at the 2012 to 2014 class of enterprise IPOs, we’ve created only about $60 billion in new market cap (and one company, Workday WDAY -1.08% , is around 25% of that amount). Add in enterprise MA by the top incumbents in that same timeframe (before the $8.3 billion SAP-Concur acquisition) and we’ve seen only $30 billion in acquisitions. And most of those acquisitions were not really of modern cloud-based technologies. There’s much more to come.我们不妨看一下目前十家仅次于的企业科技巨头的市值（SAP也是其中之一）：它们的总市值多达1.3万亿美元。但如果再行想到2012年到2014年的IPO数据，你就不会找到，这些IPO只建构了600亿美元的市值（Workday一家公司就贡献了其中的25%）。如果把同一时期十巨头的收购不道德也计算出来在内（在SAP以83亿美元并购Concur之前），我们找到并购总额只有300亿美元。
其中大多数并购标的并不是确实意义上的云技术。So despite all the excitement about the number of new enterprise technology IPOs of late, we haven’t seen the final salvo in the battle. Not even close. As the above numbers illustrated, there’s more than 10 times the amount of legacy market cap outstanding compared with the amount of new market cap created through IPOs or acquisitions to date.所以说道，尽管最近企业科技领域的一连串IPO让很多人兴奋不已，但现在还没到云技术向传统平台发动“猛攻”的时候，甚至差得还近。
正如前文数字所说，传统技术占有的市值与最近的IPO和收购所建构的市值比起，差距何止十倍。That means we’re going to see the acquisition ‘arms race’ escalate, and number of new enterprise IPOs continue to grow. And not only will we see the legacy players engage in more acquisitions, but we will likely see acquisitions from some of the larger new incumbents — like Saleforce.com and Workday — as they seek to stay ahead of the curve.这意味著，我们将不会看见并购领域的“军备竞赛”持续升级，同时，重新加入IPO大军的企业科技公司也不会更加多。
不仅传统科技公司不会展开更好的并购不道德，一些新兴科技巨头很有可能也要乘机并购，以维持竞争优势，比如Saleforce.com和Workday。Acquisitions alone don’t tell the entire story, though. Perhaps even more interesting is the corporate splits and spinoffs I mentioned earlier. The legacy enterprise players are now reconfiguring themselves into more focused, slimmer, and presumably more agile players so they can better compete in the brave new world. (To further complicate things, making targeted acquisitions of new technology companies will most certainly be part of the legacy players’ post-split strategy, too).不过，并购并不等于全部。
更加有意思的是前文提及的企业拆分与挤压。传统企业科技公司现在于是以想方设法地使自己显得更加专心，更加苗条，进而沦为更加灵活性的竞争者，以便更佳地在这个全新的世界中竞争制胜。（对新型科技公司展开定向并购，完全认同是这些传统科技公司在拆分后不会采行的策略。
）Either way, the signal is clear: There’s a platform shift happening. This time, the legacy players won’t survive by relying on their old lines of businesses. And as previous startups are becoming the new legacy players, some of the older incumbents are trying to reconfigure themselves into startup-like businesses. Another inversion of sorts.不管怎样，信号都是显著的：目前平台转型正在再次发生。这一次，传统科技公司难道无法倚赖老旧的业务吃老本。
上一批初创公司将要变为新的“传统”公司，同时一些“重义者”则企图瘦身成类似于初创公司那样的企业。这又是另一种直流电源。
Acquire or split. No one seems to be going at this organically, from within. Something that’s been forgotten is that Concur started out as a conventional on-premise software company before making the difficult and sometimes costly shift to being a SaaS company. As its CEO noted over five years ago:不管是并购还是拆分，或许没有人不愿自发性地从内部变革自己。人们大约忘了：Concur一开始也是一家传统软件公司，后来它做到了个艰苦的要求，代价了高昂的代价，才转型成一家软件即服务类公司。该公司CEO五年前曾回应：“I don’t believe large companies can make the conversion. Forget their genetic code. How many will take the pain? Companies won’t reinvent themselves… Cash flow will get crushed. You have to layoff. The transition is really hard and it’s very sudden. If you’re north of $100M it’s hard. Over $1B it’s impossible.”“我不坚信大公司能构建这种转型。且不说什么‘基因密码’，有多少家公司不愿忍受这种伤痛？企业都想重塑自己……现金流不会被毁坏，而且你必须裁员。
转型的过程是十分艰苦的，而且十分忽然。如果你的市值是1亿美元以上，转型不会十分艰苦；如果多达10亿美元，那就是不有可能的事情。”There, at least, not much has changed.最少从这个角度来看，目前还没多大转变。
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